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Voting and Decisions in the ECB
Matthias Brueckner* 




This paper analyses the interaction between decisions on mon­
etary policy in the future European Central Bank and different 
voting mechanisms. Using a simple stochastic model for prefer­
ences over monetary policy it is shown that the voting mecha­
nism described in the actual statute leads to inefficient outcomes. 
The paper shows as well that the inefficiency can be resolved by 
allowing for sidepayments. The optimal monetary policy can be 
implemented by a noncooperative bargaining game. Moreover, by 
modifying the definition of the shares of the ECB, sidepayments 
can be introduced without drastically changing the institutional 
design of the ECB.
Keywords: European Monetary Union, voting, bargaining, 
Shapley value.
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According to the Maastricht treaty some or all member states of the 
European Union (EU) will form an European Monetary Union (EMU) 
at the latest in 1999. The formulation of monetary policy will then be 
made by the Governing Council (Council) of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), which consists of the national central bank governors and the 
members of the Executive Board (Board). The primary objective of the 
ECB is to maintain price stability. A second objective is to support 
without prejudice to the primary goal the general economic policy in 
the EU. Since price stability and support of economic policy are not 
exactly defined, there will probably arise some conflicts over the optimal 
monetary policy between the members of the decisive Council. The treaty 
prescribes that such conflicts have to be resolved by voting among the 
members.
In this paper these conflicts arise from the fact that for different 
countries the optimal monetary policy will differ [for a detailed overview 
see Giovanetti and Marimon (1995)]. These conflicts can be about the 
concrete specification of price stability, e.g. due to fiscal disparities or 
different fiscal business cycles across countries, or about the choice of the 
optimal monetary instruments to achieve price stability, i.e. because of 
different monetary transmission mechanisms. The focus of the paper is 
on the consequences of conflicts over monetary policy within the Council 
and not on the origins of these conflicts.1 Hence the optimal monetary 
policy will not be modelled explicitly. Instead I use a simple stochastic 
model for a AT-country EMU where all countries are ex-ante symmetric 
with respect to their preferences over monetary policy. This enables a 
thorough investigation of the interaction between decisions and the al­
location of voting weights within the Council. Since this paper analyses 
the situation for a given EMU, I neither address the normative question 
whether a EMU is pareto better compared to the status-quo of inde­
1The latter questions is investigated in detail in the literature on monetary inte­
gration, see e.g. de Grauwe (1994); for models taking polito-economical aspects into 



























































































pendent national central banks2 nor the positive question what kind of 
EMU would result from a bargaining process between different national 
countries3.
One of the main questions that will be addressed regards the out­
come of the decision-making process within the ECB in dependence on 
specific institutional characteristics. Moreover I will analyze the implica­
tions for efficiency and distribution across countries of this process and 
the relationship between efficiency and fairness considerations. Finally 
I want to answer how the actual statute of the ECB can be modified 
in order to achieve a paxeto improvement. In general the decisions over 
monetary policy and the distribution of the benefits from it depend on the 
preferences of the countries, the underlying voting game and institutional 
characteristics, namely the possibility of making sidepayments. It will be 
shown that the voting mechanism influences the national benefits differ­
ently in an institutional setting with than in one without sidepayments.4
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 a framework which 
stylizes the future ECB will be set up. In section 3 the benchmark cases 
of jointly optimal decisions and fixed decision rules will be introduced. 
I will analyze in section 4 the decisions in the case that sidepayments 
are not possible. I will show that the expected welfare of a country in 
the EMU depends directly on his power in the voting game if power is 
measured by the Shapley-Shubik power index. On the basis of this result 
the optimal allocation of voting weights will be derived and compared 
with the benchmark cases and with alternative weights that focus on 
fairness instead of efficiency. Section 5 considers the outcome in the 
case that sidepayments are (without limits) possible. I will introduce 
a non-cooperative bargaining game among the national governors that 
implements the jointly optimal monetary policy. I will show that the 
sidepayments necessary for this implementation are a function of the 
distribution of voting weights in the voting game and the country specific
2This is done in the Optimal Currency Area literature, see e.g. de Grauwe (1994).
3For theoretical models see e.g. Casella (1992).
4 The influence of voting on the benefits from monetary policy under a regime 




























































































optimal monetary policies. In section 6 I will discuss how sidepayments 
can be introduced into the ECB so that the jointly optimal policy can be 
implemented. The moderate change of the ECB statute I will propose 
enables sidepayments by changing the shares of the ECB. The proposal 
has the feature that the expected welfare of a nation is determined solely 
by the moments of the distribution of preferences over monetary policy. 
In section 7 an example for a likely future EMU is provided in order to 
illustrate the results of the previous sections. Section 8 concludes the 
paper.
2 General setting
Throughout this paper the ECB-Council is regarded as a collection of N  
player, who decide in every period t  about a monetary policy x t 6 X  that 
is binding for every member. I take N  as exogenously given, meaning 
that the decision about who joins the EMU is made. Moreover I assume 
that there is no possibility of leaving the EMU.
The preferences over monetary policy of the members i e  N  in 
period t, denoted by r*(, are assumed to be random variables. I make 
the following assumptions about their distribution.
x*it are i.i.d. across countries and time, E  (x*t) =  0, Var (x*t) =  a
(Al)
The values for the preferred monetary policy x*t are the solution 
of the national welfare maximization problem with respect to x t, i.e. x*t 
is the optimal monetary policy for country i, taking into account the 
responses of all (national and foreign) agents to monetary policy and 
the fact that xt is binding for all countries in the EMU. For simplicity 
I assume monetary policy to be one-dimensional, X  C 3ft. The easi­
est interpretation is that xt is the inflation rate, but the analysis does 
not depend on the assumption that the ECB has complete control over 
inflation.5




























































































The assumption E  (x*( • x j t) =  0, i /  j, implies that countries 
face only idiosyncratic shocks in every period. The existence of additional 
common shocks would not alter the analysis substantially but make the 
expressions more complicated. The assumption E  (xjt) =  E  (x*() Vi, j  
is crucial for the analysis. This can be justified since the EMU should 
be founded by countries that have a similar structure. Especially the 
convergence of inflation rates in all likely participants in the EMU and 
the fact that, unlike in the past, all national governors will be politically 
independent, might indicate that systematic conflicts over monetary pol­
icy are not likely to occur in the ECB. E  (x*t) =  0 is made just for 
convenience.
The utility function of a player i G N  is given by
Ui,t =  ~  « ,  -  * t) 2 (A 2)
The welfare of a country is given by
Witt =  v  ■ U^t, E 7< =  1> 7i < 72 < ... <  7n- (A3)
i eN
Moreover I use the following simple (European) welfare function:
W i - E  Wm =  E  -7* (< t  - * 0 2- (A4)
i eN i eN
The utility function of a governor can be interpreted as a reduced loss 
function (multiplied by —1) arising from the fact that the joint monetary 
policy is not (necessarily) equal to the individually optimal one. National 
welfare is simply the individual utility of the governor multiplied with 71. 
The factors % are importance measures reflecting that monetary policy is 
likely to be more important for bigger countries (e.g. since more people 
and/or more economic activity are affected). The assumptions about 
the normalization of 7< and the ordering of N  according to importance 
are just made for convenience. Hence (A2) and (A3) imply that national 
governors behave as if they aim to maximize the welfare of their countries.
principle no problem. If we had m  instruments zJ, z t =  ( z ) , z tm) C Z m, then xt 




























































































The way how the governors are chosen lies outside our analysis. Since the 
utility functions are time-separable and the optimal monetary policy is 
time-independent, the governor might represent the interests of the mean 
or the median in his country.6 *A shortcoming of these specifications of the
analysis between different sizes of the ECB since the benefits of forming 
a EMU are not included in (A2) and (A3).
Regarding the informational structure I assume
x \ t are common knowledge among all players in period t. (A5)
(A5) becomes crucial in section 5 but could be relaxed in section 4. This 
assumption can be justified if we recall that x*t depends on the actual 
data and the parameters of the correct (politico) macroeconomic model 
of each country. Common knowledge about economic data is a plausible 
assumption and the parameters of the underlying economic model can in 
principle be estimated by everyone.
The voting game within the ECB-Council is characterized by (d, w). 
The vector of voting weights (or simple the votes) w =  (wlt w?, ...wn) is 
fixed over time, but can be chosen in the beginning. The value of d 
gives the decision (majority) rule, i.e. the minimum number of votes 
required for a majority. The coalitional (or characteristic) function, i.e. 
the function v : 2N —> SR that assigns to every coalition S' C TV a value 
as its worth, of a voting game is given by
For the voting game I make the assumption that it is constant-sum in its 
coalitional function, i.e.
(v (S ) =  1) (v (N \S )  =  0), or (ws > d) •*=> (wN\S < d) (A6)
6If we would relax the assumption E  (x jt • x*it_ t ) =  0, it might be beneficial for a
country to select a more conservative governor [following Rogoff(1985)].
utility and national welfare functions is that they allow no comparative
1 if ws — J2 Wi ^ ^
•es





























































































This assumption always holds if d is the simple majority rule and there 
is no possibility of a tie.7
The assumptions imply that every country has effectively one player 
in the voting game. At a first glance this feature seems a bit at odd with 
the actual ECB statute. According to the statute the Council consists of 
the national governors and the members of the ECB-Board. It is difficult 
to make assumptions about the preferences of the latter, especially if it is 
taken into account that they are elected unanimously by the EU-Council. 
There are some justifications for the simplification of not regarding the 
members of the Board explicitly. First, it might be assumed that the 
members of the board have the same utility function as the governor 
of their country of origin.8 This implies that countries with members 
in the Board have accordingly more voting weights. Another possibility 
is to assume that the Board members have no specific preferences over 
monetary policy and hence abstain from voting (and abstention are not 
counted in the voting game). A third justification could be that the 
statute might be changed such the board members have no voting rights 
in the Council.9
A general feature of this framework is that no member of the Coun­
cil cares directly for the welfare of the EMU as a whole. In my view 
this is a consequence of the EMU being a confederate system where the 
outcomes will probably be evaluated by the agents on the basis of the 
economic situation in their home country. Since the basic concern of the 
EMU should be the utility of the individuals in the different countries, 
the leading role of national interests in the decision making of the ECB
7Formally we could replace (A l) by
f ^  +  1 if wN is even 
1  ^  l  if wn  is odd
j  A ( i S  | w s  =  wS\N)
8This view is expressed e.g. in Alesina and Grilli (1992).
9A strict seperation of formulating monetary policy (done by the Council) and its 





























































































is not only unavoidable but also no principal weakness of the system.
3 Two benchmark cases
A main concern of this paper is to analyze the dependence of the decisions 
made in the ECB-Council from the distribution of voting weights. Since 
the voting weights are chosen in the beginning, we analyze the outcomes 
in terms of expected national and European expected welfare. It follows 
directly from (A1)-(A5) that
E  (WM) =  E  ( - 7< (x*t -  x t)2)  = - 7< (a + E  (xt2) -  2E  (x*t • xt) jjl)
E (W t) = e ( j 2 W« )  = - U  +  ^ K ) - 2 ^ 7iS (x * t .x t))(2 )
\ i € N J  \  i eN )
Now I consider two benchmark cases in order to evaluate the dif­
ferent welfare results of voting mechanisms.
The first case is the one of jointly optimal decisions. The following 
proposition is straightforward:
P roposition  1 x\ — l i xi,t• Hence the joint optimal policy is the
i eN
weighted mean of the individual optimal policies with the importance mea­
sures as weights.
Proof. Wt = —7< (x *t ~  x t)2- The F.O.C. of maxW( me
i ’ xt
dWt / . x „—  =  Ç 27i (xM- x t) = 0
=  ] r 7ixt <^xt =  ] r 7ix*t
i t  i





























































































In this case we have
« W  = * | e h ]
=  £ ( E ^ ^  +  2 E E  7 i7 j< t4 t)  =  X /7?
\  * * /  «
E ( x l tx t) =
=  E  ^7i*jJ +  X J ^ M 2̂  =  a 7i
(4)
Hence we get from (1) and (2) 10
E {w *,t) = -7< (<7 + 0-X ] 7 ? -2o-7 ij
V «6N /
=  -O’ ( t< + 7< X I 7? -  27A
\  iSN J
E (W t*) = ~  ( a  + v Y s ' y ? - 2 a J 2 7 ? )  =  _CT( 1 _ X 7? )  (7) V *6JV « )  \  i eN /
(5)
(6)
The second benchmark is that of a fixed monetary policy in each 
period. For the optimal fixed monetary policy x{ I make the following 
proposition.
P roposition  2 x[ = E  (x*t) = 0  Vf is the optimal fixed monetary 
policy.
Proof. Since the fixed rule by definition has to be chosen in the begin­
ning, the problem is
x{ =  max E (W t) Vt
xt 10
10Note that the variance of the jointly optimal monetary policy is lower than the





























































































or, using (2), x{ =  max -  I a + E  (zt2) -  2 ^ 7jE  (x*t ■ x t) |
** V >eJV )
=  max -  I cr +  re? -  2 ^  7<xf £  (x*it) J
14 \  *eJV /
=  min a  +  X(Xt
=> x{ =  0 ■
For this case we get from (1) and (2)
E  (W&) =  —7»<Ti E  (V/) =  -o- (8)
If we compare the benchmarks cases we have 
£ ( W / )  < £ ( W t*), e ( w ( ^ E { W Q  if ^ 72 - 27<| 0.
«eJV
Since the fixed monetary policy is almost surely different from the jointly 
optimal, it yields strictly lower European welfare. From their individual 
point of view, the small countries (those with 7i < 5 $3 7?) would be
better off under the fixed rule.
tev
4 N o sidepaym ents
In this section I assume that no sidepayments among the members of 
the ECB Council are possible, neither within nor between periods. The 
voting procedure is described as follows. Every member has the right to 
propose a monetary policy xt . If a majority (in the voting game) votes 
for this proposal, it is accepted. Otherwise it is rejected and again every 
player has the right to make a proposal. In this situation the median 
voter theorem applies, i.e. the chosen monetary policy of the ECB will 




























































































Proposition  3 In an EMU without sidepayments and satisfying (Al)- 
(A6) we get xt = x*m t Vf.11
Proof. See Appendix. It is simply a proof of the standard median voter 
theorem applied to this model. ■
A voting equilibrium in the ECB is a pair (xt\ at) , af =  (aiit, ...anjt), 
ai,t € (yes, no) with )T) Wi > d. It follows directly from proposition
i:aitt= yes
3 that in any equilibrium xt = x*m t. If we assume (infinitesimal small) 
bargaining costs, equilibria always exist and xt =  x*m t will be proposed 
immediately. Obviously there are many equilibria since many vectors 
a( fulfill the majority criterium, but they all share the same monetary 
policy. There is a unique equilibrium in not weakly dominated strategies 
that is characterized by ai<t =  yes Vi. Since in equilibrium x t =  x*m t, 
voting ai<t =  no either does not change the outcome or (if a majority 
votes no) leads to a new bargaining round yielding a lower pay-off since 
xt =  x*m<t is agreed on later.
In the case without sidepayments we get
E (x l)  = E ( x * l ) = a  (9)
E  (x*it -x t) =  <pi • E  (x £ )  + Y ^4> j-E  (x*t • x*t) =  faa , (10)
j^i
where cj), is the probability that i is the median. Inserting (9) and (10) 
into (1) and (2) yields
E (W i>t) =  —27i<7 (1 — fa)
E  (Wt) =  —2ct ^ 2  (1 -  fa) = - 2 o
(11)
( 12)
11The assumption of common knowledge (^15) can be replaced by the assumption 
that every governor i knows only x*t if we add an annoimcement stage before the 
voting procedure. The strategy-proofness of median voter schemes ensures that the 
announced x* t are their true values. The announcement stage simply avoids poten­





























































































Giving (^41) the probability fa is solely determined by the voting 
game (d,w). More precisely, we can make the following lemma:
Lem m a 1 The probability of being the median voter is exactly the Shapley- 
Shubik (1954) value in the voting game, i.e.
fa =  fa (d, w) =  £  [v (S) -  v (,S \i)], (13)
S3i
where s =  |5 |.12
Proof. The definition of the median voter (33) implies that
K S ) - t , ( s \ i ) ]  =  { 1 if i =  m  
0 if i ^ m
Under (Al) every ordering of the players according to their realization 
of x*( has the equal probability Denote the set of players with pref­
erences ’left’ resp. ’right’ of player i with
Li { j  | Xjjt — x i,ti i  7̂  ®}> Ri — { j \ Xj't ^  Xi t , j  ^  i}
Let S  = LiUi. There are (s — 1)! possible orderings of the players j  6 L{ 
and (n — s)! possible orderings of the players k G Ri. Hence
prob ((x*t < x*t Vj 6 fa) A (x*kt > x*( Vfc e  Ri)) = —— — —
(14)
Summing these probabilities over all sets Li where i = m  gives then the 
probability of i being the median voter. 13 ■
12In formula (13) I use S\ i  instead of S \  { i } . In the following I will replace {i} by 
i whenever the context makes clear that a coalition is meant.
13Note that the Shapley-Shubik index is defined for games with transferable utility 
(TU games), while we are considering a game with non-transferable utility (NTU 
game). It could easily be shown that the Shapley-Shubik index equals the consistent 
(Shapley) value for NTU games defined by Maschler and Owen (1989) for hyperplane 
games if we let
( y € R’ : ^2 yi < 1  i i w s  >  d 
V(S) =  < ies
( 0s  if ws <  d
Hence it might be more appropriate to interprete the Shapley-Shubik index as a special 




























































































If we want to achieve the most efficient outcome given that side- 
payments are prohibited, that the decision is made in every period t and 
that the voting weights have to be chosen in the beginning (in period 0), 
we have to maximize E  (Wt) with respect to the voting weights w.
P roposition  4 0* =  1, 0* =  0 Vi ^  n maximizes E (W t) if no
sidepayments are possible. This is feasible with any allocation of voting 
weights we satisfying u£ > d.
Proof. Consider an allocation of voting weights w ' yielding
4>n = 1 -  A, <j>j = A, = 0 Vi /  n , j , A 6 (0, 1]. We
have
E {W t { ^ ) ) - E ( w t ( ^ j )
= E  (Wn,t (0>e)) -  E  (W n,t (<£))] +  [E (Wjit (0 ')) -  E  (Wiit ( 0 ) ) ]  
=  0 +  2ct7„ (1 -  (1 -  A))] +  [-2(77,- +  2ct7 (1 -  A)]
=  2ct7„A — 2CT7 , A = 2ct A (7» — 7, ) > 0 V A because 7„ > 7j.
(w‘ > d) => (0' =  1) follows directly from the definition of the 
Shapley-Shubik value. We have v(S) — v (S \n ) =  1 VS 3 n and 
v(S) — v (S \ i ) =  0 VS 3 i, i 7̂  n. Hence we get in this case 0* = 
£  (‘-W "- ')1 = l  and 0? =  0 V i^ n B
S3n
This implies that if we are interested only in European welfare, all 
the power should be given to the most important country (measured in 
terms of 7<). For the expected utility of the countries and the expected 
(European) welfare we get in this solution:
i f  i =  n 
i f  i ^ n
E (W f)  =  —2(7 (1 — 7n)
(15)
(16)
If we take the Maastricht treaty in his existing form as point of departure 




























































































sidepayments, gives one vote for each governor for the most important 
decisions and allows for 6 members of the board. Thus if Germany as the 
biggest country could send all members of the Board and would select 
agents with identical utility function as the German governor, we would 
get the most efficient outcome under the constraint that sidepayments 
are not feasible. But most likely this would not be enforceable in the EU 
Council that decides on the members of the Board. Moreover we will see 
in the subsequent sections that solutions yielding higher expected welfare 
are implementable.
If we are interested in voting allocation yielding fair results, we 
have to specify fairness. One possibility is the fairness postulate that the 
share of expected utility of country to the expected European welfare 
should equal its importance measure, i.e. — 7»- This specification
of fairness can be called fair distribution of benefits.
P roposition  5 fa = £ gives a fair distribution of benefits. One possible 
allocation of voting weights guaranteeing this is w\ =  1 .
Proof. E^ t )E{Wt) 71 - 4 - E , j )  =  7‘
l  -  $  =  l -  =  Z)7<$ =*■ 1n
And w\ =  1 =$• fa = £ since the Shapley-Shubik value fulfills the
symmetry axiom Wi = Wj =$■ fa = fa. M
Inserting this result into (11) and (12) gives
E ( w ‘t) =  -■bn, ( i - i )  
£ ( K ? )  -  - 2» ( l  - i )
(17)
(18)
Hence taking the voting distribution laid down in the Maastricht treaty 
is one possible way of getting a fair distribution of benefits if we could 
ensure that the members of the board abstain from voting and that 




























































































Another possible fairness specification is to require a fair distribu­
tion of power in the sense that the probability of being the median equals 
the importance of a player, i.e. =  7<- Since tf> is not continuous in w, 
$  = 7i might not be feasible if we use a fixed decision rule like simple 
majority. But by using a measurable fairness criterium one can choose 
wp to get the most fair distribution of power, see Brueckner (1996) for a 
formalization and application to the ECB.
Supposed <j% =  7  ̂ is feasible, we get in this case directly from (11) 
and (12)
E(W?it) = - 2 0 7 ,( 1 - 7 0  (19)
If we compare these three different voting distributions we, w6 and 
wp with respect to efficiency, we can make the following corollary.
Corollary 1 E  (Wte) > E  (W?) > EW tb
Proof. E  (Wf) > E  (Wf ) follows directly from proposition 4.
The proof of E  (Wf) > E W b runs the same arguments than the 
proof of proposition 4. Moving from wp to w6 means redistributing 
power from the players with 7» > £ =  7 to those with 7, < K  And the 
increase of utility of the small players is lower than the decrease of utility 
for the big players since =  2a/yi. ■
If we compare the expected welfare from using this three different 
voting weight distribution with our benchmark cases, i.e. if we compare 
(16), (18) and (20) with (7) and (8), we can make the following corollary:
Corollary 2 E(W ?) > E (W .?), E  (V/) > E (W {) i f ln  <




























































































Proof. (E  (W?) >  E  (W?)) o  ({2 -  7») >  ( l  -  ] 
=► ((2 -  7n) >  (1 -  7n)) (1 > 7» (1 -  7«))-
( ?))<* ( ( 2 - 7 n )  ( i - E t? ) )
The latter always holds since 7„ < 1.
The other three relationships follow immediately from comparing 
the values of expected welfare. ■
Prom these two corollaries it follows that expected welfare is strictly 
higher if the joint optimal decision could be implemented. If we take e.g. 
the intermediate case of a vote distribution wp the expected welfare loss 
in the case of no sidepayments is twice as high as in the social optimum. 
And as long as the biggest country is not assumed to be more important 
than all the other together, even the introduction of a fixed monetary 
rule would always improve welfare.
Comparing the three voting weight distributions with the bench­
mark cases leads to the following corollary
C orollary 3 For i =  n we have
f o r i ^ n ,  7i >  i
E  (W* ) >  E  (W* ) > E  (Wft) , E  {W*t) > E  (W*) ,  E  ( w ' t)  > E  (W* )
f o r i ^ n ,  7i =  i
E  (W Q  = E  (W* ) > E  (W*t) , E  (W*t) > E  (W*) ,  E  ( w £  )  > E  (W*)




























































































All relations14 follow directly from comparing the values for ex­
pected national welfare. Prom this corollary it follows that all but the 
biggest player prefer the fixed monetary policy to all three voting mech­
anisms. Moreover, 7„ < |  is sufficient (not necessary) for these players 
i ^  n  to prefer the optimal rule over any described voting rule. And the 
biggest player is better off than in the benchmark cases only under the 
vote distribution we which is the least preferred for all players.
For the proceeding it is helpful to note as well the following corollary 
regarding the pareto superiority of the joint optimal decision..
C orollary 4
E(W *t) > E { W i,t {4>i)) Vi Vi
This corollary, which follows directly from (5) and (11), defines 
a condition for the voting game ensuring that every country is ex-ante 
pareto better off if the joint optimal decision could be implemented. The 
power (measured by the Shapley-Shubik index) should not exceed too 
much its importance. It is shown already in Corollary 3 that the voting 
weight vector wp always fulfills this condition and that w6 fulfills it under 
an additional, not very restrictive, condition. But we violates this con­
dition. Applying the voting weights yielding the most efficient outcome 
under the constraint of an impossibility of sidepayments prevents on the 
other hand that all countries have an incentive to implement the joint 
optimal monetary policy.
5 Full sidepaym ents
Now I consider the case that the members of the Council have the possi­
bility for unlimited side payments. The discussion on how sidepayments 
could be introduced in the ECB will be done in section 6. The outcome




























































































of the decision making process is a pair (xt, st), where st =  (s iit)  is the 
vector of sidepayments. Taking into account that allowing for sidepay- 
ments means opening a market (for monetary policy) that was missing 
in the previous section, it is straightforward that we get in this case the 
jointly optimal policy in every period.
P roposition  6 In an EMU with sidepayments and satisfying (^41)-(i46) 
we get x t =  x£ Vt.15
Proof. Suppose a winning coalition S  | ws > d forms and chooses 
Xt = xt 7̂  with
WiJt (*«) > WiJt (xt*) V ie  5  and Wj<t (xt) <  Wu  (x(*) Vj e  N \S
Then the coalition N \S  can form and offer every player i £ S  a side- 
payment
Si = Witt (xt) — Wi<t (x*) if S  chooses x’t instead of xt.16 Denote
Ws (xt) =  w i,t (x t ) , WN\S (x t) =  Wj,t (xt) , ss = Y ^  Si'
its  jeN\s i es
Because x t ^  x*t we have
Ws (xt) +  WNKS (xt) < Ws (x*t ) + WN\S (x*)
<=> Ws (xt) — Ws (x£) < W W  (x‘) -  WNXS (xt) 
ss < Wn \s (^t) — Wn \s (x t)
N \S  can divide ss such that
- S j < W j}t (x;)-W j't (xt) Vj 6 N \S , J 2 ~ si = ss ( = > I >  =  0
i \  k e N
15Note that (A l) is only needed to ensure that the national optimal poicies x* t do 
not depend on the sidepayments. Assumption (A5) is crucial for this proposition.
16Throughout the paper side-payments are defined as positive when a player receives 





























































































(xt*,sfc) h  (£t,0) V k e N .
We need a mechanism that determines how the jointly efficient 
outcome can be achieved, i.e. we have to specify the sidepayments. I 
assume that bargaining in the ECB follows the bargaining mechanism in 
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). Since this model is based on a coalitional 
(or characteristic) function, we first have to construct such a function 
dt : 2,n —> 5R.17 18In the tradition of von Neumann and Morgenstern i?t(5) 
is usually the value that S  can guarantee itself under the assumptions 
that the coalition of all other players (N \S ) forms and that it has strictly 
opposite interests to S  [see Weber (1994)]. Both assumptions are ques­
tionable in our game. Since the monetary policy is a public good we 
should not assume that the game is constant-sum in his coalitional func­
tion. As a consequence it might not be the worst case for a coalition S  if 
N \S  forms but if only subsets R  C N \S  form. Evidently the coalitional 
function should be different for winning coalitions (WC), i.e. those coali­
tions S  with ws > d, and loosing coalitions (LC), i.e. those coalitions 
S  with ws < d. It is reasonable to assume that in any case a winning 
coalition (WC) will form. Following the original conservative perspective 
of the coalitional function I specify i9t (S') as
E W<,t (xs,t) if ws > d
M S ) = <
ies
mink RcN\StwR>d |  E  Wi,t (xR,t) |  if Ws < d
18 (21)
where x*s t and x*Rt are the solutions to the problems max ~ 7* (x *,t ~  xt)2
xt ies
resp. max (x* t — xt) . Since a WC can implement the monetary
xt jeR
policy which is jointly optimal for their members this is obviously the
17In order to avoid confusion with the coalitional function of the voting game I use 
i3 instead of v for the bargaining game.
18This coalitional function does not fulfill the normalization 0 6 V (5), i.e. in our 
TU context 0 <  v(S),  which is used in Hart and Mas-Colell(1996). But since this 
requirement can be changed without loss of generality (see their Footnote 4), their 




























































































least they can get. Rationality implies that a WC would actually do 
so and hence a LC has to take this decisions as given, but it does not 
know which WC will form. Obviously fit is not constant-sum, but this 
is true for many applications of cooperative game theory [see e.g. Young 
(1994)]. Note that fit is a function of the random variables x*t and the 
voting weights w since the latter determine whether a coalition is winning 
or loosing.
In order to apply the bargaining mechanism of Hart and Mas-Colell,
the coalitional function has to fulfill the condition fit (S ) + (j) <
jer\s
fit (T) V5 C T, which is the formulation for TU games of the monotonic­
ity condition imposed by Hart and Mas-Colell for a coalitional function 
of a general NTU game. The following proposition shows that fit (S ) 
fulfills even the stronger condition of superadditivity.
P roposition  7 (21) is superadditiv, i.e.
fit (S) + fit (T) < fit (SU  T) V S D T ^ Q ,  S , T C N
Proof, see Appendix ■
Superadditivity means that there is always a incentive for players 
to form and to merge coalitions. Since monetary policy is a public good, 
superadditivity ensures that free-riding on the decisions of others is not 
the optimal strategy.
Since the individual preferences x*t and the national welfare func­
tions W<it are time-independent, we can regard the decision making process 
in the ECB as a sequence of static bargaining games. I consider the non- 
cooperative bargaining game by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) which is 
defined as follows:
D efinition 1 In each period there are (potentially infinite many) bar­
gaining rounds. In each round one player j  6 R (R is the set of active 
players, in the first round we have R  =  N ) is chosen randomly (with 
equal probability) and makes a (feasible) proposal. I f  all the other player 




























































































player refuses we move to the next round. In this round the set of active 
player is with probability p again R and with probability 1 — p it is R \j. 
If the proposer drops out he gets a final pay-off.
The solution concept to this bargaining game is the concept of 
stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), i.e. those subgame perfect 
equilibria where the equilibrium strategies does not depend on time. In 
our case this concept means that strategies depend on R  and j  but not 
on the number of the round.
In our game, a proposal is a pair (xt , s() consisting of monetary 
policy and the vector of sidepayments. We can interprete the bargaining 
as one over the distribution of Wt and determine the sidepayments in a 
proposal indirectly by siyt =  biyt — Wiyt (xt) , where bi<t is the proposed 
share of Wt (xt) of player i. The final pay-off of a dropped-out proposer 
j  in our game has to satisfy sjit = 0. Hence we get for the case R  =  N  
that the final pay-off becomes •& (j ) if proposer j  has to drop out and the 
remaining player find an agreement.19
The defined bargaining game is an unanimity game since every 
player can prevent an agreement. The justification of using an unanimity 
rule when sidepayments are allowed in the EMU stems from the following 
arguments. The simple majority rule for deciding about xt does not 
apply for proposals over sidepayments. There is, for obvious reasons, 
no mechanism described in the ECB statute that gives a majority in 
the voting game the possibility for extracting sidepayments from the 
minority against their will. In principle proposals of the kind (xt, st) with 
Si,t > 0 Vi G S, ws < d, cannot be rejected by a minority S. But it 
follows from proposition 11 that such a proposal will not be accepted by 
the majority itself since making concessions to the minority in exchange 
for sidepayments is beneficial for both sides. Hence the voting game 
influence the power of the player within the bargaining game, but the 
bargaining outcome finds and requires the acceptance of every player.
19Of course that final pay-off changes if R  C N  or R \i  find no agreement. In the 
article of Hart and Mas-Colell all these pay-offs are set to 0, but again this is just a 




























































































Proposition 1 of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) says that the propos­
als of an SPE are always accepted, pareto optimal and that j  proposes
proposal. Theorem 2 of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) states that the bar­
gaining game has a unique SPE and that under p —> 1 the proposal in this 
SPE converges to the Shapley value ipt — (At )  of the game (TV, i?(),i.e.
It follows directly from these results that we can state the following 
theorem:
T heorem  1 Suppose the ECB fulfills (j41)-(^46) , allows for sidepay- 
ments and the bargaining within the ECB-Council follows in each period 
definition 1. Then in equilibrium each period one randomly chosen na­
tional governor makes the proposal (x*t , s(*) and every governor i votes 
for x* and accepts s ) .
The distribution of voting weights does not affect the chosen mon­
etary policy (since proposition 6 is true for any w) but determines the 
distribution of pay-offs since s* is via the coalitional function a func­
tion of w. In order to compare different vote distribution from an ex-ante 
point of view, we have to compute the expected Shapley value for the 
different countries.
The expected value of the coalitional function (21) is given by
the other players their expected pay-off for the case anyone rejects the
( 22)
Hence we have in equilibrium b*t =  A t  and thus
=  A t  -  w *  ( A ) . (23)
E ( M S ) )  = <
if ws  >  d





























































































where 75 =  7«- The computation of the expected value for a LC is quite
ies
complicated, especially since the x*Rt are dependent random variables. 
But in principle this expected value can be determined when the complete 
distribution of the x ' t is given.
Under the assumption that the utility of a member is linear in the 
medium of the sidepayments we get for the expected utility (including 
s*t) of country i
= E  P  (S) -  # (S\«)]) (25)
=  E  {S — )l i n  ~  ~  &  (* (S)) - E i f l  (SV))] (26)
t r  n!
The expected value of the sidepayments are given by E  (si>t) — E  (ipiit) — 
E  (Wi<t (x*)), i.e. by the difference between (25) and (1).
6 Introduction of sidepaym ents in the ECB
We have seen that by introducing sidepayments the jointly efficient mon­
etary policy can be implemented and that this would lead to a consider­
able welfare gain. The actual design of the ECB does not describe any 
sidepayments. It seems to be unrealistic that the countries supply their 
governors with an amount of money for making explicit sidepayments 
within the bargaining. One possibility would be to link the decisions of 
monetary policy implicitly to other policy issues outside the ECB. But 
since the ECB is independent it is difficult to find a way how a governor 
could make credible commitments for concessions on policy issues outside 
the ECB.
A more promising way to implement the efficient solution is to 
modify the statute of the ECB. It is reasonable to assume that the im­
plementation is easier if the modification is only moderate. My proposal 




























































































shares of the ECB. Actually the share of a country (c^) is defined as the 
mean of the share of population and the share of GDP. It is mentioned 
explicitly that the share should equal the relative importance of a coun­
try. Hence we can interpret the actual statute as one with at =  71. Since 
population and GDP do not necessarily grow identical across countries, 
the shares have to be recalculated after a certain period even under the 
actual statute. According to this statute the shares determine the allo­
cation of profits of the ECB. Hence the expected monetary value of the 
shares is the discounted stream of the expected future profits. I denote 
this value by E P  and assume it to be positive.
Denote the number of periods between the recalculations of the 
shares with r  and denote the points in time for this recalculation with 
T  =  0,1, ...20 Moreover denote the sum of sidepayments a country has 
to receive or to pay between T  — 1 and T  with
where gitT is the change in relative importance between T  and T  +1. For 
simplicity I assume that E  (g<iT) — 0 Vi. A i<T (si<T) is the new component 
that introduces sidepayments. In my view it is advantageous if A i<T has 
a identical functional form for all i and for all T. For restricting the set 
of feasible functions I make the following proposition:
P roposition  8 E  (A,? )  =  0 Vi is a necessary condition for implement­
ing
x t = x\ 'it via the shares of the ECB.
20E.g. we had monthly meetings of the ECB and the recalculation every second 
year, we had r  =  24, t  would be measured in month and T  in two-years.
t= (T - l)-T + l
The proposal is to change the definition of the shares from
£*«,T+1 =  a i ,T  +  3 i ,T































































































('£E(<*i,T+i) = ' £ E M =: ij  ^ £ > ( A <iT) =  0
If E ( A iiT) =  OVi does not hold, there exist some i with E (A i<T) = 
E  (Aj) <  0. Taking a starting value a ii0 as given, we get for these coun­
tries
Since the shares have to be positive, this means that it will be expected in 
the beginning that these countries will loose all their shares at one point 
in time. Since shares are regarded here as the only possible medium of 
sidepayments, these countries cannot make sidepayments from T° on­
wards. Thus their interests will not be taken into account and hence the 
optimal solution will not be implemented in all periods. ■
The following specification of Ai j  fulfills this condition:
Since E P  is the expected value of the total shares, ^  gives the propor­
tion of shares that equals the value of the sidepayments. The expected 
value of the shares of each country equals the original value, i.e.
(29) implies that the sidepayments are effective not in T  but in T  +  1. 
If AitT would depend on the actual central bank profit Pt (i.e. if the 
sidepayments would be executed without a lag), E  (A^t ) =  0 might 
not hold. Because the actual profits of the central bank depend surely 
on the chosen monetary policy, PT and sitT are both random variables 
depending on the national optimal policies between T  — 1 and T  and 
hence not independent.
Subtracting E  (siiT) from sitT is necessary for fulfilling the condi­
tion E  (AiiT) =  0. The preceding section has shown that the expected
3T° | E  (a i>TO+1) =  a j>0 +  T° ■ E  (A<) <  0
(29)




























































































sidepayments are a function of the voting weights and the parameter of 
the model. Since this function is not continuous in w, there exist almost 
surely some i with E  (s^t ) < 0. The formula works like endowing the 
countries with E  (s<,t ) < 0 endogenously with the capability of making 
sidepayments of E  But if we take the existing statute as one with 
equal votes for each country, we have seen in section 4 that each country 
is better off with sidepayments in the ECB as long as no country is too 
powerful, i.e. as long the condition in corollary 4 holds. Hence changing 
the definition of the shares to (28) and (29) is pareto better in period 0. 
Thus implementing the new recalculation formula for the shares should 
be supported by every country. Moreover this formula avoids a compli­
cated bargaining over the voting weights.
The definition in (29) is not sufficient to ensure the feasibility of 
introducing sidepayments by reformulating the existing adjustment for­
mula of the shares. We have to regard as well the non-negativity con­
straints of the shares a<,r+i >  0. Even a restriction of the distribution of 
x*it (leading to restrictions of A iiT) is not enough since a series of unfavor­
able realizations of the individual countries would lead to the occurrence 
of <  0 for some i.
A straightforward way of solving this problem is the following. A 
minimum value of the shares of all countries, a <imin(> 0), has to be 
defined. a <imin =  0 Vi is feasible but eventually one wants to limit the 
possibility that the shares of very small countries become larger than the 
ones of the big countries. If the calculation of shares according to (28) and 
(29) leads to aitT+i < a<,mm the national government of that country has 
to provide the governor with extra money. More specifically, if the value 
of shares arising from (29) is denoted with the government has to
pay (ai,min — &i,T+i) * EP . This amount has to be distributed among the 
countries who reused their shares in T, e.g. proportionally to that raise. 






























































































if OLitT+1 < &t,min 
if OCi,T+\ <  a i,T
i i
T, (ai,T+l-“<,5 
if <*i,T+1 >  Qt,T
(31)
The adjustment implies that national governments have to intervene in 
the ECB system, but in a predefined way not allowing for political inter­
ventions. Still it would be wishful if the probability of these interventions 
is very low. This probability depends on the distribution of x*t, the value 
of E P, the chosen values of a iimin and the voting game v. Prom these two 
arguments only the latter two are choice variables. Obviously the proba­
bility of intervention decreases with lowering the values of <aiimin. A voting 
game Vi can be regarded as better than another game v2 if
is lower for all i.21The example in the following section illustrates how an 
appropriate allocation of voting weights helps to introduce sidepayments 
into the ECB without having a high probability that national govern­
ments must provide extra money to achieve the joint optimal monetary 
policy.
vious sections. Since the decision about admission to the EMU will be 
made only in 1998 as a result of a bargaining process within the Council 
of the EU, based on the fulfilling of the convergence criteria, statements 
on the size of the starting EMU unavoidably have a speculative element.
21 Another justification for Qiimin >  0 fo r  some i can be founded on fairness con­
siderations. Taking a voting game v  as given, =  (aj,min, ..., could be used
to ensure that (32) is equal for all i.
prob ([s,iT -  E  (s,,T)] < (a<imin -  diiT+x) EP) (32)
7 An Example




























































































Reflecting the current speculations, I assume that the EMU is 
formed by 11 countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, Prance, Ger­
many, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
If we focus on the inflation criterium, probably only Greece will fail it. 
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom actually do not plan to join 
the EMU in the first stage.
Table 1 gives the importance measures of these countries, as defined 
in the statute, and the expected national and European welfare values in 
our benchmark cases from section 3, namely the joint optimal monetary 
policy X( and the fixed monetary policy x! .
The importance measures reflect that our EMU is formed by 
countries of very different size. The two biggest countries, Germany and 
Prance are together more important than the remaining 9 together. On 
the other hand, Luxemburgs importance is nearly negligible, it is less 
than 1%.
Column 3 of table 1 shows that the expected loss is continuous in 
the important measures of this EMU11.22 But the difference between 
the expected loss of Germany and Prance is small given their difference 
in importance (Germany is nearly 50% more important than Prance but 
its expected loss is less than 10% higher). The reason is that size has 
two opposite effects on expected national welfare when the joint optimal 
policy is adopted. On one hand, since in bigger countries more people 
and a higher GDP is affected by monetary policy, the total loss from 
deciding an individually suboptimal policy increases with size. On the 
other hand, an increase in importance raises the influence on the joint 
optimal policy and hence reduces the loss. If a fixed monetary policy 
would be chosen, column 4 shows that while the expected total loss from 
this policy is nearly 25% higher than in the case of an optimal policy, only 
the big countries Germany, Prance, Italy and Spain would fare actually 
better under this regime.23
22This result does not necessarily hold for a smaller EMU, e.g. in a EMU consisting 
of Germany, France, Austria,Ireland and the Benelux countries the expected loss 
would for France would be the highest




























































































Table 2 gives the expected national and European welfare when no 
sidepayments are allowed for the three voting weight allocation discussed 
in section 4. Due to the non-continuity of the Shapley-Shubik power 
index, the condition power equals importance (i.e. 0  =  7  ) cannot be 
fulfilled in our example for any voting game with a simple majority rule. 
The chosen vote allocation gives at least fairer results than the other.24 
In Brueckner (1996) this problem is discussed in more detail and it is 
shown as well that in a EMU consisting of all EU countries the condition 
0  =  7  can almost be fulfilled. Note that for w6 and wp the condition 
derived in corollary 10 holds so that in these cases implementing the joint 
optimal monetary policy is a pareto improvement.
Tables 3,4 and 5 consider the effects of implementing the joint op­
timal policy by allowing for sidepayments.
The tables give the expected Shapley values, expected sidepayments 
and the variance of the sidepayments for the alternative voting weight 
allocations w6, wp and w7. Instead of giving the sum of the sidepayments 
(which is always 0), the last row in columns 4 and 7 give the expected 
amount of money needed for sidepayments, i.e. they give
£ ( * )  =  £ (  5 £ k . |
\  ieN
Due to the described difficulties in deriving the theoretical expected 
Shapley values, the tables give the empirical values from a simulation. I 
specified the preferences x ‘ t as U[— 1, 1] distributed, leading to a  =  | .
preferences over monetray policy, this result would probably change. This is because 
the national welfare from a fixed monetary policy would decrease while from the 
optimal policy it remained unchanged.
24The corresponding vector of the Shapley-Shubik values is
0 ” =  - i -  [3.4; 3.95; 2; 45; 20.78; 32.45; 0.78; 17.05; 0.22; 6.1; 2.84; 9.99;]1UU
. This can be regarded as fairer as w  =  7  what would yield





























































































I chose 500 draws for each country from this distribution, with monthly 
meetings this would correspond to more of 40 years of our ECB. Prom 
these realizations of preferences over monetary policy I computed the 
coalitional functions vt according to (21) and then the Shapley values 
and sidepayments as defined in (22) and (23).
Figures 1-3 show the development of shares over time according to 
formulas (28) and (29) with the adjustment in (31) for the cases when a 
country hits the lower border. For the border I took c*i|min =  0 Vi. More 
over I chose r  =  24, with monthly meetings this corresponds to biannual 
recalculations of the shares. For the expected profits of the ECB I picked 
E P  =  |  =  4. Note that the main purpose here is to illustrate that with 
an appropriate voting weight allocation it is less likely that countries 
actually hit the borders than with alternative vote allocations.
We see that with w6, i.e. equal votes for each country, Ireland 
and Luxemburg hit the lower border 1 resp. 2 out of 19 times. With 
w7 Luxemburg hits the border three times, while no intervention of any 
government occurs by using wp.
One should be very careful with drawing conclusions from this one 
example. But it might indicate that, using the mechanisms developed in 
this paper, there is actual no trade-off but a complementarity between 
fairness (in terms of power) and efficiency (measures by potential negative 
impacts of, predefined, governmental interventions).25 It seems that the 
volatility of the shares is higher when the power in the voting game 
differs substantially from the importance measure.26 Under the rule one- 
country-one-vote Ireland and Luxemburg are extremely overrepresented. 
And w7 yields in this example not only governmental interventions by 
Luxemburg but also a high volatility of the shares especially in the case 
of France. As a result France has once even the last but third lowest 
share of all countries, what could be explained with the high variance
25 Similar findings occurred with a previous simulation for a EMU7.
26Note that in the absence of governmental interventions the variance of the shares 
is given by




























































































of sidepayments for France. A possible explanation for this result is 
the difference between power and importance that is much higher in 
w7 (and w6) than with wp. However, a more thorough estimation of 
the parameters of the model and a deeper investigation of the effects of 
different voting weight allocations is necessary to find the optimal voting 
weights.
8 Conclusion
In this paper a simple framework for an EMU with ex-ante identical pref­
erences of the member states over monetary policy and random shocks 
was used to illustrate the influence of the distribution of voting weights 
on the monetary decisions and the distribution of welfare effects among 
the different countries. Due to the crucial role of the voting weights 
the votes assigned to every national central bank governor should not 
be given ad-hoc but after a thorough investigation of their welfare and 
distributional effects.
We have seen that without sidepayments the decisions will be sub- 
optimal. Moreover in this situation there is a strong trade-off between 
efficiency and fairness. The expected welfare is maximized if the most 
important country has a majority of votes for its own. This solution 
seems hardly be acceptable for the other countries. Furthermore it re­
moves the incentive for the most important country to implement the 
joint efficient solution.
There is a substantial welfare gain by allowing for sidepayments. 
The Application of the bargaining game introduced by Hart and Mas- 
Colell (1996) has shown how the efficient solution can be implemented in 
a non-cooperative manner. In this case the allocation of voting weights 
determines uniquely the expected distribution of benefits. These results 
can be used not only for the ECB but also for the analysis of many other 
institutions where sidepayments can be introduced and where voting pro­
cedures are used to find a final decision.




























































































dicates that it is worthwhile to look for concrete procedures how side- 
payments can be introduced. The analysis is section 6 has shown that 
with redefining the shares a moderate change in the statute of the ECB 
is sufficient for a pareto improvement of the European Monetary Union. 
Moreover the simulation in section 7 has indicated that there might be 
a complementarity between fairness and efficiency.
An interesting extension of the model would be to analyze the case 
where not all of the members have ex-ante identical preferences towards 
monetary policy and where the random shocks may be partly correlated. 
Since the analysis in sections 5 and 6 did not depend on identical dis­
tributed preferences, their main results would remain unchanged. But it 
might occur that some countries (those with a high probability of being 
the median voter in the game without sidepayments) are no longer better 
off if the joint optimal monetary policy is implemented. Hence additional 
effort might be necessary to overcome their resistance against an intro­
duction of sidepayments. If implementing the jointly efficient monetary 
policy is not feasible, intermediate scenarios are possible. In the case 
that a minority has systematically diverging preferences, the majority 
might be able to implement their (group-)optimal policy without having 





























































































Proof of Proposition 3:
Denote the set of players with preferences ’left’ resp. ’right’ of 
player i with
Li — { j  | Xj't  ^  x i,ti i  /  *} 1 LU =  {j | x j,t —  x i,t> 3 7̂  *}
The median m is the player i who fulfills the condition
(wLi < d) A {wRi < d) (33)
It follows directly from (A2) that a unique median exists. Then we have
Vi E {Lm U m} • Xm,t >; xt i f  Xm,t < X(
K  +  Wm > d) => (x( <  *m.t) (34)
V ie {R m U m} ■ Xm,t xt * / Xm.t > Xt
{WRm +  wm > d) => (xt >  *»,t) (35)
([34] A [35]) x t == *m,t ■
Proof of Proposition 11
The proof will be done for the three possible cases (ws > d) ,
(ws < d A wsut < d) and (ws < d A tusur >  d ) . Here we assumed 
without loss of generality that ws >  wT
1. (u)S >  d ):
m s ) =  E  w «(**«) • *< m  - { E  ^  ( * .
«es '  ’ (>eT
(T) <  E  Wi,t (^s.t) since 5  C JV\T and ws > d  
ie  t
dt (S) + dt (T) < J 2  W«  (x h )  <  E  (^sur.t) = ^ .(S U T )






























































































2. (Ws < d A Wsut < d): Denote
U S  =  {R \ R C  N \S ,wr > d } , R T  = {R \ R c  N \T ,w R > d}  
U S T  =  { R \ R c N \ ( S U T ) , w R > d}
R S T  = R \ d t ( S u T ) =  Wt,t (ajy)
ieSuT
Then we get
M S ) < since 71<S 2  71<ST
>es
M T ) < E ™ m (*m tJ since 7£T D R S T
ieT
M S )  + M T ) < E ) = M S U T )
ieSuT
3.(ws < d A u>sut >  d): First note that
x SuT,t
1 . 7s • Zs,t +  7t • x ’T,tE  7i®m =
7s =  E 7< .7t =  E 7<
7s +  7r
ieS >eT
Denote the players outside S u T  with K  =  Ar\ ( 5 u T ) .  We have 
(5) < ( < t  -  xTuK ,t)\dt (T) (xh  ~  xsuK,t)2
ie S  j e T
Hence it is sufficient to proof that




~  (xj,t — xSuT,t) — 0
jeT
r,/_ . _» \ .. / ,7r*5y+7iir*fr1i \ a 7r*5-,t +  7*xK,t
F  “,Xn,t) =  7S I ------:  ------ ) -  2 jsxs,t------ --------------7s
7s^s,t +
-  (7» + 7 ri ( 7 ^ , ^ ^ , y  +  2(7sX. , + 7T ^ )  7 ^ .  +  7 T ^ .  > 0




























































































Note that F  (x\ t , =  F  ( x \ t +  c, t +  c) for every constant c.
Hence we can use without loss of generality the normalization x*S t — 
— 7iX*t — 0. Thus it is sufficient to analyse
75 tes
f  (XT,<) XK,t)
( 7T*T.t +  7k X *k i \ 2 , ( I k X k A 2 o .
H  1 - 7 »  j  + 7 r ( r ^ J  - 2^ , .
-  (7 s  +  7 t )
/  7r^r,t y  
\ 7 s  +  7 t /
+  2')T^T,t
lTXT,t 
7  s F  I t
7K*K,t 
1 - 7 t
We see immediately that / ( 0 , 0) =  0 and D f{ 0,0) — 0. Hence it is 
sufficient to proof that /  (x^(, t) is convex. The second deritives D2f  
can be written as
2-
+  ;7t (1 - 7 s - 7 t ) ( ( ^ ? - ^
7 r ( l - 7 s - 7 ^ ) ( ( i ^ - l ^ )  ; (1 - 7 s - 7 t )2 ( ïï^  +  (Î^ )
This matrix is positiv definit (and thus /  (x j t , x*K^) convex) since
^ ( ( l - 7 S), + 1 s + 7 r ) > 0
and
7 s  (4 -  7 s  -  7 t ) >  027
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C Tables and Figures
Table 1: Importance and expected welfare in the benchmark cases
Country 7i E ( W ’t) e ( w / )
Austria 0.0305 -0.0346-<t -0.0305-ct
Belgium 0.0367 -0.0412 a -0.0367 a
Finland 0.0178 -0.0206-a -0.0178-a
France 0.2128 -0.1640-a -0.2128-a
Germany 0.3124 -0.1785-a -0.3124-a
Ireland 0.0112 -0.0131-a -0.0112-a
Italy 0.1863 -0.1534-a -0.1863-a
Luxemburg 0.0020 -0.0023-a -0.0020-a
Netherlands 0.0553 -0.0600-a -0.0553-a
Portugal 0.0248 -0.0284-ct -0.0248-a
Spain 0.1103 -0.1076-a -0.1103-a
EMU(total) 1 -0.8039-a -O





























































































Table 2: Expected welfare without sidepayments
Country we E(W ?t) w6 E{W ?) w p E{W ?)
Austria 1 -0.0610-ct 1 -0.0553-ct 31 -0.0589-cr
Belgium 1 -0.0735-cr 1 -0.0668-ct 38 -0.0706-ct
Finland 1 -0.0356-ct 1 -0.0323-cr 18 -0.0347-ct
France 1 -0.4256-ct 1 -0.3869-er 213 -0.3371-cr
Germany 11 0 1 -0.5679-ct 277 -0.4220-cr
Ireland 1 -0.0224-ct 1 -0.0204-a 11 -0.0222-cr
Italy 1 -0.3726-ct 1 -0.3387-ct 187 -0.3091-ct
Luxemburg 1 -0.0039-<t 1 -0.0036-ct 1 -0.0039-cr
Netherlands 1 -0.1105-cr 1 -0.1005-cr 59 -0.1038-cr
Portugal 1 -0.0495-ct 1 -0.0450-cr 25 -0.0481-ct
Spain 1 -0.2206-ct 1 -0.2006-cr 145 -0.1986-cr
EMU(total) 21 -1.3753-er 11 -1.8182-0- 1005 -1.6091-ct
Source: Own calculations
Table 3: Cases with sidepayments
Country E  ( « . ) E « . ) Var ( 4 t)
Austria 0.0208-cr 0.0561-cr 0.3183-cr • 10- 3
Belgium O.OO88-0- 0.0496-u 0.3117-cr • 10-3
Finland 0.0464-cr 0.0674-a 0.3729-rr • 10“ 3
France -0.2743-ct -0.1060-cr 2.1241-ct • 10“ 3
Germany -0.4059-ct -0.2298-ct 7.3395-ct • 10-3
Ireland 0.0602-ct 0.0729-ct 0.4259-cr • 10“ 3
Italy -0.2260-ct -0.0766-cr 1.3386-ct • 10- 3
Luxemburg 0.0783-ct 0.0805-cr 0.4990-ct • 10" 3
Netherlands -0.0269-ct 0.0334-<t 0.2911-cr-10~3
Portugal 0.0328-ct 0.0603-cr 0.3447-ct • 10- 3
Spain -0.1164-cr -0.0079-a 0.5867-ct • 10- 3





























































































Table 4: Cases with sidepayments (cont.)
Country E  (V?,) E (‘U Var (slt)
Austria -0.0358-a -0.0004-a 0.0543-a • 10- 3
Belgium -0.0418-a -0.0010 a 0.0755-a • 10- 3
Finland -0.0194 a 0.0016-a 0.0177-a • 10- 3
France -0.1811-a -0.0129-a 4.5946-a • 10“ 3
Germany -0.1569 a 0.0192-a 2.7676-a • 10" 3
Ireland -0.0102-a 0.0025-a 0.0104-a • 10" 3
Italy -0.1451-a 0.0044-a 3.9622-a • 10“ 3
Luxemburg -0.0006-a 0.0028-a 0.0100-a • 10"3
Netherlands -0.0628-a -0.0025-a 0.2168-a • 10“ 3
Portugal -0.0262-a 0.0012-a 0.0331-a • 10- 3
Spain -0.1235-a -0.0149-a 1 .0200-a • 10"3
EMU(total) -0.8022-a 0.1653-a 12.762-a • 10“ 3
Source: Own calculations
Table 5: Cases with sidepayments (cont.)
Country E « . ) E « . ) Var (sit)
Austria -0.0256-a 0.0098-a 0.0463-a • lO" 3
Belgium -0.0301-a 0.0107-a 0.0668-a • 10~3
Finland -0.0106-a 0.0104-a 0.0329-a • 10" 3
France -0.1871-a -0.0189-a 2.5892-a • lO" 3
Germany -0.2014-a -0.0254-a 2.3366-a • 10"3
Ireland -0.0109-a 0.0018-a 0.0069-a • lO” 3
Italy -0.1632-a -0.0137-a 2.2597-a • 10"3
Luxemburg -0.0011-a -0.0011-a 0.0014-a • lO"3
Netherlands -0.0463-a 0.0140-a 0.2013-a • 10" 3
Portugal -0.0179-a 0.0095-a 0.0326-a • lO" 3
Spain -0.1079-a 0.0006-a 0.7617-a • lO"3
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